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This paper explores the experience of information sharing, coordination, and integration of 
actions of the Civil and Military Polices in the state of Minas Gerais, Brazil, in the context of 
the IGESP program. The IGESP is based on the introduction of information management 
systems and organizational changes akin to those associated with COMPSTAT. All the 
evidence presented points to a causal effect of the IGESP on crime. The most conservative 
estimates indicate a reduction of 24% in property crimes and 13% in personal crimes. There 
is also evidence that the IGESP is associated with improved police response, measured by 
apprehension of weapons and clearance rates. We present one of the first set of causal 
estimates – with a clear identification strategy – of the impact of COMPSTAT-like programs. 
The results suggest that the coordination and informational gains represented by the program 
may constitute a first-order factor in a successful policy for fighting crime. 
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1. Introduction 
Police systems with multiple commands exist in various countries. In some cases, a 
militarized and uniformed police is responsible for ostensive patrolling while a judiciary police is 
responsible for investigations (see Bayley, 1985). In Brazil, this system manifests itself in the 
existence and almost total independence of the Military and Civil Polices (“Polícia Militar” and 
“Polícia Civil”). These two police forces have different attributions, hierarchical structures, and 
geographic organizations, maintain separate systems of information, and answer to distinct 
state agencies. The problems of coordination, information exchange and trust between 
organizations generated by this dual structure have been identified, both internationally and in 
the particular case of Brazil, as barriers to the effectiveness and even democratization of police 
action (on Brazil, see discussion in Beato, 1999, Chesnais, 1999,  and Bicudo, 2000; in the 
international context, see Bayley, 1999). Still, despite the widely held belief that unification of 
police forces or integration of operations would lead to increased efficacy and reductions in 
crime and violence, there is no statistically robust evidence supporting this view or estimating 
the degree of inefficiency generated by the dual system.  
  This paper explores the experience of information sharing, coordination, and 
integration of actions of the Civil and Military Polices in the state of Minas Gerais, Brazil, in the 
context of the Program of Integration and Management in Public Safety (“Programa Integração 
da Gestão em Segurança Pública,” from now on IGESP). The IGESP was inspired by the 
COMPSTAT system, implemented originally in New York and later on adopted in slightly 
modified forms in various cities in the world. The model is based on modern technologies of 
information monitoring and targeted policing, using a dynamic updating and constant 
evaluation of strategies and actions by police organizations. Analyzing municipality level data 
and exploring the staggered process of adoption of the IGESP, we provide what we believe is 
one the first pieces of causal evidence on the effect of information sharing and integration of 
dual police forces on crime and police performance. From a broader perspective, the paper also 
illustrates with an extreme example how public sector productivity may be adversely affected 
by lack of communication and coordination among state agencies with overlapping or 
interacting jurisdictions.   2
Starting in the 1990s, the state of Minas Gerais experienced a seemingly explosive 
increase in crime. The violent crime rate (per 100,000 inhabitants), for example, increased by 
400% in the short interval between 1990 and the early 2000s (from around 100 to above 500). 
In this context, violence figured as one of the main public policy issues for the government that 
took office in 2003. The first action of the new government in the area of public safety was the 
creation of the Secretariat of Social Defense (“Secretaria de Defesa Social”), consolidating the 
two previously existing Secretariats of Justice and Public Safety (“Secretaria de Justiça” and 
“Secretaria de Segurança Pública”). The IGESP was then introduced as part of a process of 
change in state administration that focused on the definition of targets, monitoring and 
evaluation of the state’s performance in various sectors. In the area of public safety, this idea 
was put into practice through a policy of integration of the entire system, so that objectives of 
different actors could be aligned and information exchanged. According to Rocha et al (2008), 
this strategy was based on two main points: (i) a governance model of joint decision making 
and integrated actions, and (ii) implementation of an information system allowing data to be 
shared among the different actors. 
In the case of Minas Gerais, the COMPSTAT-like features of the program were coupled 
with the additional objective of creating a single unit of decision making and action from the 
two independent bodies of police forces. This implied a redesign of the geographic organization 
of the two polices and some definition of the authority relationship between their independent 
hierarchical structures. The IGESP was then implemented at the most disaggregated level 
within the new geographic organization of the public security system. The program implied the 
adoption of a unified information system and police management strategies based on the 
COMPSTAT model, and the institutionalization of periodic meetings between the commands of 
the Civil and Military Polices (together with other agents of the public security and justice 
systems, such as district attorneys, municipal secretariats of public safety, etc.).  
The encompassing package of changes represented by the IGESP brings in several new 
elements to police management in Brazil. We do not have adequate data, and do not believe 
that there is enough independent variation along these various dimensions, to analyze the 
separate effect of each one. So we choose to analyze the overall impact of the implementation   3
of the IGESP. The program was initially adopted by the state capital (Belo Horizonte) in 2005 as 
a pilot project, and then subsequently expanded to encompass 56 municipalities by 2008. We 
use data between 2000 and 2008 on the universe of municipalities in Minas Gerais (853) and, 
exploiting the staggered process of program expansion, apply a difference-in-difference 
strategy to identify the effects of the IGESP on crime rates and police performance. Our most 
conservative estimates suggest that implementation of the IGESP reduced property crimes by 
24% and personal crimes by 13%. There is also some evidence of reduction in homicide rates 
after one year of program implementation, but this effect seems to be strongly associated with 
the experience of the state capital. Robustness exercises suggest that the main results are not 
related to other policies implemented at the municipality level, to changes in socioeconomic 
conditions, or to pre-existing differential trends in violence. All the evidence supports the idea 
of a causal impact of the IGESP on crime rates. In addition, we present evidence that 
implementation was associated with improved police performance, through increased 
apprehension of weapons, increased clearance rates, and increased fraction of arrests 
originating from investigations (reduction in the fraction of arrests in flagrante delicto). 
Another initiative of integration of Civil and Military Polices took place in the Brazilian 
state of Ceará in the early 1990s (see Brazil and Abreu, 2002). But the experience of Minas 
Gerais retains particular importance, given the depth of the change implemented, its 
persistency through time, and its consistent geographic expansion. Case studies and qualitative 
analyses of the experiences of both Ceará and Minas Gerais support the success of the strategy 
in reducing crime and increasing police efficiency (see, for example, Brasil and Abreu, 2002, and 
Beato et al, 2007). Still, there are no econometrically sound analyses of the impact of these 
programs currently available. 
To our knowledge, there is also no empirical literature on the integration of dual police 
systems or on similar types of public sector reorganizations, be it in other countries or in other 
areas outside the scope of public security. The literature most closely related to this paper is 
probably that on the impact of the COMPSTAT system. The information and management tools 
implicit in the COMPSTAT, and the reorganization of operations implied by them, are closely 
related to the technological and organizational change represented by the IGESP. There are   4
numerous papers describing the process of expansion of the COMPSTAT system in the US, its 
logic and potential limitations (Walsh, 2001, Brown and Brudney, 2003, and Weisburd et al, 
2003). There are also various case studies and time series analyses on the impact of the 
COMPSTAT in specific contexts (for example, Manning, 2001, Willis et al, 2003, and Rosenfeld et 
al, 2005). But, again, there is virtually no study with a sound identification strategy and using a 
representative sample. 
The only exception is Garicano and Heaton (2010), who are interested in the impact of 
information technologies on organization and productivity. They use a large sample of US police 
departments from a law enforcement survey and estimate, in a panel context, the impact of 
information technologies and what they define as “modern policing” techniques. The results 
indicate that information technology investments, when linked to particular organizational and 
management practices similar to those associated with COMPSTAT, tend to increase police 
productivity. Still, due to data limitations, they can only conduct explicit analyses of the impact 
of COMPTSAT in a single cross-section. 
From this perspective, our paper can also be seen as a contribution to the literature on 
the evaluation of COMPSTAT-like programs. Differently from other papers on the topic, we use 
a panel and adopt the typical strategy from the impact evaluation literature. We use data on 
the universe of affected municipalities and explore a singular episode of centralized decision on 
program implementation and expansion, which warrants some degree of exogeneity in 
adoption. We have a clear identification assumption and test its validity in the data. And, finally, 
we find robust evidence on the effect of COMPSTAT-like interventions on crime and police 
performance, though in our context these responses are likely to be magnified by the dual 
police structure that existed previously. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional 
background of police organization in Brazil and discusses the main features of the IGESP. 
Section 3 describes the data used in our empirical exercise. Section 4 discusses the empirical 
strategy and its limitations. Section 5 presents our main results and robustness tests. Lastly, 
section 6 concludes the paper. 
   5
2. The Program of Integration and Management in Public Safety (IGESP) 
The integration of operations and actions of the Civil and Military Polices in the state of 
Minas Gerais took place within the Program of Integration and Management in Public Safety 
(“Programa Integração da Gestão em Segurança Pública” – IGESP). The main goals of the 
program are to allow the free and immediate flow of information between the two police 
forces and the coordination of integrated planning (see Beato et al, 2007).  
In an unprecedented example in Brazil, the methodology was developed by the Centre 
for Studies of Criminality and Public Safety of the Federal University of Minas Gerais (“Centro de 
Estudos de Criminalidade e Segurança Pública da Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais” – 
CRISP/UFMG), in close cooperation with the Military Police and the state administration. The 
program was largely inspired by the experience of the COMPSTAT in New York, and its 
subsequent adaptation to the Colombian city of Bogotá. The model is based on modern 
technologies of information monitoring and targeted policing, using a dynamic updating and 
constant evaluation of strategies and actions by the police organizations. More specifically, the 
IGESP targets: (i) consolidation and systematization of data and intelligence information 
gathered by different agents within the state public safety community, generating a common 
and updated database shared among the different parties; and (ii) coordination of strategic 
actions involving the various parties.   
An important part of the consolidation of information was the implementation of the 
Integrated Information System of Social Defense (“Sistema Integrado de Informações de Defesa 
Social” – SIDS), responsible for the sharing of information across the Military and Civil Polices, 
the judiciary, the public defensory, and the penitentiary system. The SIDS was a precondition to 
the implementation of the IGESP, and it was instituted officially on April 2004 (State Decree 
#43.778, April 12, 2004). Operationally, the SIDS allows the unified management of 
information, be it related to police investigations, crime registries, judicial prosecutions, or 
enforcement of criminal court orders.  
The coordination of actions and information sharing within the IGESP takes place 
through strategic meetings involving police forces and other authorities, to be explained in 
detail later on. In short, the meetings are supposed to lead to a deeper understanding of the   6
criminal phenomenon, through discussions focused on the identification of hot-spots, key 
individuals in the local crime, and potential underlying causes for changes in the local dynamics 
of crime and violence. 
The team of researchers that worked with the police in the design of the IGESP identifies 
the following points as its main goals (Beato et al, 2007): (i) to promote interaction and 
integration of the Civil and Military Polices; (ii) to allow the exchange of information in the area 
of public safety; (iii) to give agility to police procedures and actions; (iv) to improve the 
performance of police activities; (v) to monitor the behavior of criminal activity; (vi) to promote 
the engagement of the community in the fight against crime; (vii) to focus police actions on 
high-risk areas; and (viii) to decentralize the strategic decisions in the fight against crime. 
A very important step in this process was the definition of geographic areas of action 
common to the two police forces. Prior to the IGESP, the Civil and Military Polices had different, 
non-overlapping, geographic organizations, so that actual and recurrent coordination of actions 
was made very difficult. This change was achieved through the definition of integrated areas, 
constituting a pre-determined geographic region subject to the joint action of specific units of 
each police force. 
This geographic division took into consideration socioeconomic, cultural, and criminal 
characteristics of the areas, but the major concern was to make it compatible with the different 
hierarchies of the Civil and Military Polices and the chain of command. Therefore, the entire 
state area was divided into subsequently smaller sets, each corresponding to a different level of 
decision within the state public safety system: (i) the state was divided into Integrated Regions 
of Public Safety (“Regiões Integradas de Segurança Pública” – RISP’s), each one with a regional 
command of the Military Police and a department of the Civil Police; (ii) these were then 
subdivided into Areas of Coordinated Integration in Public Safety (“Áreas de Coordenação 
Integrada de Segurança Pública” – ACISP’s), corresponding to a regional station of the Civil 
Police (“Delegacia Regional”) and a battalion of the Military Police; and (iii) these were then 
finally subdivided into the smallest units, the Integrated Areas of Public Safety (“Áreas 
Integrada de Segurança Pública” – AISP’s), defining the areas of action of a police station of the   7
Civil Police (“Delegacia”) and a company of the Military Police. The actual implementation of 
the IGESP took place at the most disaggregated level, the AISP. 
The first RISP was the pilot project developed in the capital Belo Horizonte in 2005, 
immediately before the implementation of the IGESP. Following, other RISP’s were designed in 
the metropolitan area of the capital (Contagem and Vespasiano) and Uberaba. In the following 
years, other RISP’s were created, with headquarters in the municipalities of Uberlândia and 
Montes Claros, until the entire state was subdivided into 16 RISP’s in 2008.
1 Appendix Table 
A.2.1 lists the different RISP’s and gives some basic characteristics of the areas.  
 
Figure 1: Representation of the Administrative Relationship of the  
Different Spheres in the Areas of Integrated Action  
 
 
The coordination of the entire system of integrated areas is responsibility of the 
Executive Secretariat, composed by members of the State Secretariat of Social Defense 
(“Secretaria de Estado da Defesa Social” – SEDS) and representatives of the Civil and Military 
Polices. This Executive Secretariat coordinates the actions of the different agents across all 
levels of the integrated areas. This administrative structure and the hierarchical relationships 
implied by it are illustrated in Figure 1. The specific responsibilities and authority of each of 
these spheres in the decision making process can be summarized as follows. 
Executive Secretariat – It is responsible for monitoring the actions of the RISP’s, ACISP’s, 
and AISP’s, and for the overall behavior of crime and the performance of the police forces in 
the state. It is responsible for the expansion and implementation of the IGESP in Minas Gerais, 
                                                 
1 Despite the fact that the implementation of the design of integrated areas started taking place in 2003, it was 
actually made official through state regulation only in early 2008 (Joint Resolution #51, February 15, 2008). For our 
purposes, the relevant aspect is the actual implementation of the project. In 2010, there was a reorganization of 
some of the RISP’s, so that the total number increased from 16 to 18 (two new RISP’s were created with 
municipalities that belonged originally to the 6
th and 7
th RISP’s). In our sample period, the original organization 
with 16 RISP’s remains the relevant one. 
RISP  ACISP  AISP 
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and for maintaining the information flow between the Civil and Military Polices and managing 
the crime data in the state. It also trains the manpower responsible for the actual 
implementation of the IGESP in a given AISP. 
Integrated Region of Public Safety (RISP) – It is responsible for the strategic planning of 
its ACISP’s and AISP’s. This planning encompasses information exchange and strategies for 
fighting crime based on coordination of actions between Civil and Military Polices. The RISP 
promotes meetings for monitoring and evaluation of joint actions, establishes timelines for the 
meetings that are to take place at the ACISP’s and AISP’s levels, and produces yearly evaluation 
reports. Within a RISP, there exists a Group of Evaluation and Support (or Regional Executive 
Secretariat), which is responsible for the continuous evaluation of the IGESP, as well as for the 
provision of support and advice for the ACISP’s and AISP’s. This group is also responsible for the 
organization and record keeping of the strategic meetings promoted by the RISP. 
Integrated Area of Coordination of Public Safety (ACISP) – It is responsible for the tactic 
planning of the AISP’s, through constant monitoring of the material conditions and 
performance of the joint actions of the Civil and Military Polices. It contains a group of support 
of the integration process, which is responsible for taking the demands of each AISP to the RISP, 
as well as for managing the implementation of the IGESP on the ground and for the confection 
of its evaluation reports.
2  
Integrated Area of Public Safety (AISP) – It is the geographic unit where the IGESP is 
actually implemented. It is responsible for the operational planning, promoting the dialogue 
between Civil and Military Polices on a routinely basis. It discusses and analyzes the goals and 
actions determined at the meetings taking place at higher levels (RISP and ACISP). It contains a 
group of data analysis, responsible for feeding, receiving and extracting data from the 
information system of the Civil and Military Polices. With this information in hand, the data 
analysis group generates the indicators that will guide the actions at the AISP level. The group 
                                                 
2 Up to 2008, the state of Minas Gerais had 31 operational ACISP’s, responsible for 123 AISP’s, in 56 municipalities. 
Of the existing AISP’s and of those planned for the future, some encompass more than one municipality, while 
others are smaller than a single municipality (depending on the size of the municipality). In principle, there is not a 
one-to-one match between municipalities and AISP’s. But, as a matter of fact, all AISP’s implemented up to now do 
not incorporate more than one municipality and, in cases where the same municipality has more than one 
operating AISP, all of them were implemented in the same year. So, for the purpose of our empirical exercise, we 
keep the municipality as the unit of analysis.   9
also organizes weekly meetings between Civil and Military Polices, where the specific goals and 
actions to be implemented at each moment in time are determined. 
Having laid down the geographic reorganization that was introduced to allow the 
implementation of the IGESP and the hierarchical structure implied by it, we now turn to the 
specificities of the program itself. The main goal of the IGESP is the promotion of dialogue 
among the state agencies in the area of public safety. This is most clearly materialized in the 
integration of planning and actions between Civil and Military Polices, but it is not restricted to 
it. In higher level meetings, it includes coordination with the judiciary, public defensory, and the 
penitentiary system. The final goal of this coordination is to allow the development of more 
effective policies and actions in the fight against crime. 
On the information side, the objective is to produce, gather, and systematize 
intelligence information, precise and up to date, available for immediate use by public safety 
personnel. This information is passed along to police forces through the strategic meetings, 
allowing for a better understanding of the criminal phenomenon, based on the precise location 
of critical points and identification of likely proximate causes. With this information in hand, 
police forces are better equipped to design tactics and strategies to fight crime, with fast, 
synchronized, and focused allocation of resources.  
On the organizational side, a key role is played by the weekly meetings taking place at 
the AISP (most disaggregated) level. In these meetings, managers and operational personnel 
from both Civil and Military Polices exchange experiences, share information, and discuss 
potential solutions. Typically, the meetings also present the crime statistics, focusing on the 
main types of occurrences and the most violent areas. On a monthly basis, there are also 
broader meetings, including district representatives from the Civil Police and battalion 
commanders from the Military Police, focused on advising and support of the actions being 
taken at the AISP level.   10
The weekly AISP meetings are registered in a report, referred to as DOGESP,
3 which 
describes the criminal incidents in the area, the activities and operations undertook for fighting 
crime, the mechanisms used in the integration of police and community, and the eventual 
problems identified in the quality of police work. In addition, the report establishes goals to be 
evaluated in future meetings and to be presented at the higher level meeting taking place 
monthly. In relation to the monthly meetings, according to Beato et al (2007, p.5, translated by 
the authors):  
“In these meetings, the main problems and occurrences identified in the 
weekly working meetings are presented, as well as the actions planned 
and/or implemented by the AISP and their effectiveness in crime 
prevention and control. Representatives from the Civil and Military Polices, 
the public defensory, the penitentiary system, and the State Secretariat of 
Social Defense are present, together with a meeting facilitator responsible 
for handling and directing the discussion, recapping discussions from 
previous meetings, and raising questions about practical issues and 
actions.(...) Questions may be raised as to the potential crime generating 
factors in a given area, the personal characteristics of victims and their 
behavior, the motivation of the aggressors and their characteristics, the 
reasons why a certain strategy worked while another did not, the progress 
achieved, the resources used, and, finally, the plans for action and what is 
intended as next steps.” 
Descriptive analyses have identified the IGESP as a potentially important factor in the 
recent reduction in crime rates in Minas Gerais. Beato et al (2007), for example, notice that 
violent crimes in the state capital (Belo Horizonte) were reduced by 17% after 8 months of the 
introduction of the IGESP. In the municipality of Montes Claros, the Secretariat of Social 
Defense identified a reduction of 45% in crime rates in a similar time interval following 
implementation. By 2009, given the positive perception on the impact of the IGESP, the state 
administration intended to accelerate the process of expansion of the program. 
 
                                                 
3  DOGESP is an acronym for the Portuguese expression for Dyagnosis Oriented for the Management and Solution 
of Problems (“Diagnóstico Orientado para a Gestão e Solução de Problemas”). It is a document filled out during the 
meeting, registering that a meeting took place and identifying the problems faced in a given AISP. Based on this 
standardized report, new solutions and strategies are proposed.   11
3. Data 
The evaluation of the impact of the IGESP is conducted with yearly municipality data 
covering the period from 2000 to 2008. The data was obtained from the Military Police of the 
State of Minas Gerais, the State Secretariat of Social Defense, the “Fundação João Pinheiro” 
(roughly equivalent to the state statistical and evaluation agency), and the “Instituto Brasileiro 
de Geografia e Estatística” (the Brazilian Census Bureau). These include variables related to the 
implementation of the IGESP, outcomes, and controls. We discuss the role played by each 
variable in the next section. They can be broadly classified into the following groups: 
•  number of crimes: number of homicides, number of violent crimes against the 
person, number of violent crimes against property (original source: Military 
Police of the State of Minas Gerais); 
•  presence of the IGESP: dummy variable indicating whether a municipality is 
covered by the program in a given year (original source: State Secretariat of 
Public Defense);  
•  police related information: number of personnel in the Military Police, number 
of personnel in the Civil Police, number of cars in the Military Police (original 
source: Military Police of the State of Minas Gerais and State Secretariat of 
Public Defense);  
•  presence of other public safety programs: dummy variables indicating the 
presence of various concurrent programs (“Fica Vivo,” “Olho Vivo,” and 
Municipal Civil Guard)
4 in a municipality in a given year (original source: State 
Secretariat of Public Defense); 
•  police outcomes: number of apprehension of firearms and other weapons, 
arrests and arrests in flagrante delicto (original source: Military Police of the 
State of Minas Gerais); and 
                                                 
4 “Fica Vivo” is a program focused on particularly violent and economically fragile areas within a municipality, 
mixing police presence and social actions. “Olho Vivo” is a program that supports the installation of digital cameras 
in key hot-spots within a municipality. The Municipal Civil Guard is an unarmed force supported by the 
municipality, responsible for ostensive policing.     12
•  municipality characteristics: population, GDP per capita, and enrollment rates in 
the public school system (original sources: “Fundação João Pinheiro” and 
“Instituto Brasileiro de Georgafia e Estatística”).  
We concentrate on homicides, violent crimes against property, and violent crimes 
against the person because reporting rates are thought to be higher for these categories (as 
compared to thefts and other non-violent crimes, for example). The choice of control variables, 
on its turn, was guided by the main concerns in our empirical exercise. Variables related to 
number of crimes and other police actions (weapon apprehensions and arrests) are used as 
outcome variables that may be affected by the introduction of the IGESP. Variables related to 
municipality characteristics and presence of other public safety programs are used as controls 
for changes that may be happening simultaneously to the introduction of the IGESP. Finally, 
variables related to police personnel and resources try to isolate the organizational and 
informational aspect of the IGESP, given the possibility that program implementation may be 
accompanied by other concurrent changes in allocation of resources and investments. All these 
concerns are discussed in detail in the next section, when we outline our empirical strategy. 
Figure 2 presents the evolution of the different types of crime (measured as rates per 
100,000 inhabitants and referred to simply as homicides, crimes against the person, and crimes 
against property) for municipalities that received the IGESP in a given year and for 
municipalities that had not received the IGESP up to 2008. To inform our later discussion and to 
give an idea of the crime dynamics in the state, we present the data organized by the year in 
which a municipality entered the program. As the data have municipalities entering the IGESP 
in every year between 2005 and 2008, this strategy generates five groups: municipalities that 
did not receive the IGESP up to 2008, those that received the IGESP in 2005, those that received 
it in 2006, and so on, up to 2008. For each municipality that received the IGESP, a point 
indicates the first year of implementation.   13
 
Figure 2: Evolution of Crime Rates by Date of Entry into IGESP – Municipalities in Minas Gerais – 
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Table 1 presents the same crime rates from Figure 2, but simply organized by 
municipalities that received the IGESP before 2008 and municipalities that did not. The table 
also presents data on population and gdp per capita. It highlights one of the main concerns in 
our empirical approach: municipalities that received the IGESP tend to be different from those 
that did not. Municipalities that received the IGESP were usually more violent than other 
municipalities, as well as larger and wealthier. In relation to crime rates, Figure 2 reveals that 
this was particularly true in the first places where the program was implemented, but became 
less so as the program expanded. In any case, our main worry is that these municipalities with 
higher levels of violence may also be intrinsically different and, because of that, may naturally 
have distinct dynamics of crime. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics – Evolution of Crime Rates (per 100.000 inhabitants), by Year 
of IGESP Implementation – Municipalities in Minas Gerais, 2000-2008 
 
  
Municipalities with IGESP in 2008 
[N = 56] 
Municipalities without IGESP in 2008 
[N = 797] 
year homic  prop  person pop gdp  p.c. homic  prop  person  pop  gdp  p.c. 
                 
2000 18.5  650.5  88.8  128,258  8,185  8.9  61.2  44.0  12,936  4,596 
2001 20.1  632.1  90.3  134,544  9,138  9.3  71.7  46.9  13,291  4,951 
2002 24.6  764.2  98.1  136,842  9,923  10.0  83.9  50.8  13,401  5,855 
2003 30.1  991.2  109.7  139,162  11,881  10.5  98.3  49.7  13,501  7,261 
2004 33.0  959.4  106.0  144,030  12,567  9.7  101.0  50.7  13,711  8,022 
2005 29.3  879.8  100.0  146,724  13,407  12.0  121.7  56.2  13,828  8,685 
2006  28.8 752.5 90.9 149,398 14,627  11.9 125.2 57.1 13,944 9,127 
2007  27.6 667.4 85.2 152,009 15,604  11.9 128.8 54.5 14,058  10,465 
2008  26.0 544.1 68.1 151,942 19,875  11.8 105.3 47.3 14,230  12,892 
Obs: Crimes rates per 100.000 inhabitants. The crimes are homicide, property crimes, and personal crimes. Group averages weighted by 
municipality population (for crime rates and gdp per capita). 
 
Figure 2 suggests that there is some time series correlation between the introduction of 
the IGESP and reductions in crime rates. In some cases, the first year of implementation is 
clearly associated with lower crime rates, while in others it seems that there might have been 
some previous reduction in crime that was intensified by entry into the program. In any case, 
various other changes were taking place in these municipalities during this period, so Figure 2 
should be taken simply as an illustration of the potential effect of the IGESP and the challenges 
implicit in our empirical exercise.   15
 
4. Empirical Strategy 
The impact evaluation of the IGESP concentrates on the outcomes most likely to be 
affected by the program and for which we have data. Our main interest lies in the incidence of 
crime and, therefore, our key variables are crime rates (homicides, property crimes, and 
personal crimes) per 100,000 inhabitants (transformed by the natural logarithm).
5 In robustness 
exercises, we also try other alternative functional forms for the estimating equation. Following, 
we evaluate the impact on the response of the public safety apparatus to given levels of crime: 
apprehension of weapons (firearms and other weapons), arrests, and arrests in flagrante 
delicto, all normalized by the total number of registered crimes (and also transformed by the 
ln). The rate of arrests per number of crimes is referred to, from now on, as clearance rate. 
The main empirical concerns in our impact evaluation exercise derive from the fact that 
the implementation of the IGESP did not take place within a controlled environment, subject to 
adequate sampling design and randomization of the intervention. Therefore, our empirical 
approach makes use of the strategies typically applied in the so-called quasi-natural experiment 
literature. Specifically, we exploit the timing of implementation of the program in a certain 
area, and the evolution of the variables of interest before and after implementation, to 
estimate the impact of the program. Our specification trusts on this difference-in-difference 
strategy and compares municipalities receiving the IGESP to those that did not receive it, before 
and after the intervention, and controlling for other confounding factors at the municipality 
level. Our benchmark specification is the following: 
 
Outcomemt = α + β.IGESPmt + γ.Xmt + θm + μt + εmt,         ( 1 )  
                                                 
5 Various municipalities in the sample are small, therefore with large variance in crime rates, and so there is a 
substantial number of zeros in the variable measuring number of crimes per 100,000 inhabitants. As the natural 
logarithm is not defined in zero, we substitute the ln for crime rates below one by zero (we substitute all negative 
or non-defined values of the ln by zero). In fact, there are very few observations of crime rates between zero and 
one (only two observations for the homicide rate, and none for the other crimes), so the relevant substitution is 
that of the non-defined logarithms by the value zero. If we were dealing with variables with very low means, this 
substitution might create a distortion in terms of estimated quantitative effects. But our crime rates have quite 
high means, so this does not seem to be a problem (conditional on positive crime rates, the average rates are 21 
for homicides, 87 for property crimes, and 60 for personal crimes).  
   16
 
where Outcomemt indicates some variable of interest (crime rates, clearance rates or weapon 
apprehension rates) for municipality m in year t; IGESPmt is a dummy variable assuming value 1 
if municipality m in year t is covered by the program; Xmt is a vector of municipality 
characteristics; θm is a municipality fixed-effect; µt is a year fixed-effect; εmt is a random term; 
and α, β, and γ are parameters. Under the usual assumptions, E[εmt|IGESPmt, Xmt, θm, μt] = 0, 
and OLS estimation of the equation above provides an unbiased estimate of β. The source of 
variation used to identify the effect of the program is the distinct timing of implementation 
across municipalities, and the comparison of municipalities that received the program with 
those that never received it. In this hypothetical setting, the random term εmt is not correlated 
with the independent variables, so OLS estimates of β indeed provide the parameter of 
interest: the causal impact of program adoption (IGESPmt = 1) on Outcomemt. 
In the context of the IGESP, there are two main potential problems in the use of this 
strategy: omitted variables and dynamic endogeneity (similar concerns are expressed by 
Biderman et al, 2010 when conducting an impact evaluation of another crime related policy). 
Regarding omitted variables, it may be the case that municipalities that received the program 
also received more resources in the area of public safety, or adopted other social and security 
policies. This might be expected if good local governments adopt good policies in various 
different areas simultaneously. Assuming that the IGESP is indeed a good policy, this would 
mean that municipalities receiving the IGESP would also have adopted other effective policies, 
so that the effect of the program would be confounded with that of other changes taking place 
at the same time. This concern is lessened by the fact that police forces in Brazil are under state 
level control, so that actual implementation is not decided at the local level. Still, it might be the 
case that good local governments would pressure the state government for implementation of 
the IGESP, and then the same type of issue would arise. 
Therefore, we include as controls in the regression above (Xmt) a series of variables 
related to allocation of resources to public safety, adoption of other local programs in the 
public safety area, and municipality characteristics associated with economic performance and 
social policy. These can be classified into three groups: (i) police resources (Civil and Military   17
Police personnel and number of cars used by the Military Police); (ii) other local programs in the 
public safety area (dummy variables indicating the presence of a Municipal Civil Guard, and of 
the “Fica Vivo” and “Olho Vivo” programs); and (iii) socioeconomic characteristics (gdp per 
capita and enrollment rates in public schools).  
The second potential problem is that implementation of the IGESP itself may have 
responded to criminality conditions within a municipality, and therefore the treatment variable 
may be endogenous. The use of municipality fixed-effects partly helps to deal with this 
problem, given that systematic time-invariant differences across municipalities are controlled 
for. But it does not solve it entirely, since the possibility of endogeneity persists in its dynamic 
version: (i) the timing of program adoption may depend on the past evolution of a variable of 
interest, such as when the program is implemented in areas that received particularly bad 
shocks in crime rates; and (ii) initial conditions associated with program adoption may also be 
associated with a particular evolution of the dependent variable, such as when there is 
convergence in crime rates over time and areas with initially worse conditions are more likely 
to receive the program (see, for example, the discussion in Galiani et al, 2005). 
We use three strategies to deal with this potential problem. First, we add to the initial 
specification linear trends at the municipality level, which eliminate concerns related to 
convergence in crime rates or, more generally, differential trends across locations. In this 
specification, the treatment variable would capture whether there was a shift in the 
municipality specific crime trend when the program was implemented. Second, we assess 
whether there is evidence of pre-existing trends in periods immediately before program 
implementation. If the program is just capturing some dynamic dimension of the behavior of 
crime not modeled explicitly in equation 1, this would also be likely to show up as a systematic 
change in the years immediately before program adoption. 
Finally, as an initial assessment of how serious the issue of dynamic endogeneity may 
be, we follow Galiani et al (2005) and Biderman et al (2010) and conduct a hazard estimation of 
the probability that a given municipality joins the program. Specifically, our dependent variable 
indicates the presence of the IGESP in a municipality. As soon as municipalities join the 
program, they leave the sample. So we estimate the effect of municipalities’ characteristics on   18
the probability of joining the program. Our main interest is on how this probability is related to 
fixed municipality characteristics and to changes in endogenous variables. Therefore, our 
hazard estimation evaluates the probability that a municipality joins the IGESP as a function of 
shocks to criminality (differences in crime rates in previous years), changes in other dimensions 
of public security policy, and a set of variables indicating initial conditions. The specific 
modeling strategy in our hazard estimation is explained and discussed in detail in Appendix A.1.  
The results show that logistic and administrative considerations were the dominant 
factors determining IGESP implementation. The state government pushed the program 
outward from the state capital in a radial fashion. At the same time, municipalities receiving the 
program first were those that housed headquarters of ACISP’s (those that had a regional station 
of the Civil Police and a battalion of the Military Police), since integration at the higher levels of 
the hierarchical structure was a necessary condition for integration at the lower levels. 
Therefore, in the estimation, distance to the state capital and presence of Civil Police regional 
stations and Military Police battalions are by far the most important determinants of IGESP 
implementation. Past shocks to dependent variables appear as statistically significant at the 
10% level in only 1 out of 18 estimated coefficients, and even in this case with a very modest 
quantitative effect. Initial levels of property crimes do seem to be systematically related to 
program adoption (positively), but this does not constitute a problem since initial conditions are 
controlled for by the fixed effects in the difference-in-difference strategy. 
In short, adoption of the IGESP is not significantly affected by past shocks to crime. So 
the dynamic issue of decision of adoption being driven by changes in dependent variables does 
not seem to be a serious concern. The fact that program implementation was decided in a 
centralized fashion at the state level, and took into account administrative and logistic 
considerations, seems to guarantee some degree of exogeneity. Still, we do address directly the 
issue of differential trends and pre-existing trends in our robustness exercises. We refer the 
reader particularly interested in the process of IGESP adoption to Appendix A.1, where our 
hazard function estimation and the results are discussed in detail. 
There are some remaining methodological issues that we deal with in our estimation: (i) 
as the variance of crime rates is directly related to population size (homicides, for example, are   19
rare events in small cities), we weight all regressions by population size; (ii) as the difference-in-
difference strategy may lead to underestimation of standard errors due to autocorrelation in 
the residuals, we cluster standard errors at the municipality level, allowing for an arbitrary 
structure of correlation within municipalities over time (as suggested by Bertrand et al, 2004); 
and (iii) as the effect of the IGESP may take time to manifest itself (establishment of trust 
between the parties, development and learning of the new technologies of coordination, etc.), 
we evaluate whether the treatment effect is heterogeneous over time. 
Finally, as mentioned before, a traditional concern in the crime literature is the problem 
of underreporting in official crime data (see Soares, 2004a and 2004b). Only a fraction of crimes 
is typically reported to the police, and the reporting rate is related to institutional development, 
police presence, type of crime, etc. Our choice of the types of crimes to be analyzed already 
takes into account this concern (reporting rates for homicides and violent crimes are thought to 
be typically higher than for thefts and other petty crimes; see Soares, 2004a and 2004b). Also, 
we use municipality fixed-effects, so that any systematic difference in reporting rates across 
locations is controlled for. Since we look at a more or less homogeneous region over a relatively 
short period of time, variations in reporting rates are likely to be small. In any case, to the 
extent that the IGESP increases the effectiveness of the public safety system, we should expect 
reporting rates to increase, so that, if anything, our estimates of the effect of the program on 
crime rates would be biased towards positive values. Any remaining concern is ultimately 
eliminated by the use of municipality-specific linear trends in some of our robustness exercises, 
which take care of differential behavior in reporting rates across locations. 
 
5. Results 
5.1. Benchmark Specification 
Table 2 presents our benchmark results, with the basic specification from equation 1 
without the inclusion of any control variable. The results indicate a negative and statistically 
significant relationship between the timing of implementation of the IGESP and property and 
personal crimes, and a negative but non-significant relationship between program 
implementation and homicide rates. As the dependent variables are in logarithmic form, the   20
coefficients can be interpreted as semi-elasticities, or the proportional effect of one unit change 
in the independent variable. The point estimates would therefore imply that IGESP 
implementation is significantly related to reductions of 53% in the incidence of property crimes 
and 20% in the incidence of personal crimes.  
But it is possible that the effect of the IGESP is heterogeneous as time passes, and this 
may be partly responsible for the non-significant coefficient in the homicide regression. This 
may be the case due to the establishment of trust among the state agencies involved in the 
coordination and integration efforts, and to the development of more adequate and efficient 
operational procedures as different parties learn about the new system. To assess this 
possibility, Table 3 presents the results of regressions identical to those from Table 2, but for 
the fact that the coefficient on the treatment variable is allowed to vary according to the time 
of exposure to the IGESP. We include three treatment variables: the first indicating whether the 
municipality is covered by the program in the current year, the second indicating whether the 
municipality was already covered by the program in the previous year (IGESPt-1), and the third 
indicating whether the municipality had already been in the program for at least two years 
(IGESPt-2). 
 
Table 2: Benchmark Specification – Effect of IGESP on Crime Rates (ln), Difference-in-difference 
(OLS) – Municipalities in Minas Gerais, 2000-2008 
     
    (1) (2) (3) 
Vars. homicides  property  personal 
           
igesp -0.0426  -0.531*** -0.197*** 
  [0.0586] [0.0534] [0.0366] 
const  2.094*** 4.548*** 3.815*** 
  [0.0345] [0.0310] [0.0247] 
     
Obs  7677 7677 7677 
R
2  0.661 0.867 0.668 
Obs.: Robust standard-errors in brackets (clustering at municipality); *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dependent variables are ln of crime rates (per 100,000 
inhabitants). All regressions include municipality and year dummies, and are 
weighted by municipality population. 853 municipalities. 
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The results indicate that there seems to be some heterogeneity in the effect of the 
program over time, particularly so for the case of homicides. For personal crimes, the results 
are very similar to those from Table 2, and most of the effect is concentrated on the first year of 
program implementation. In the case of property crimes, most of the effect is still concentrated 
on the first year of program implementation, though there are also significant lagged effects. 
Still, in this case, the aggregate effect over time is very close to that presented in Table 2: Table 
3 suggests that roughly 60% of the effect estimated previously is due to the simultaneous 
impact, while 40% comes from the increased impact over time.  
For homicides, where the effect of the IGESP did not appear as significant in Table 2, the 
strongest effect appears in the first lag, or the year after the initial implementation of the 
program. As in the case of property crimes, column 2 suggests that the effect of the program on 
homicides also tends to increase over time, since the coefficient on IGESPt-2 is negative and 
statistically significant. This result seems reasonable, since the determinants of homicides are 
more complex in nature and, therefore, should not respond immediately. This would be the 
case, for example, if more investigative effort were required to reduce homicide rates. 
 
Table 3: Lagged Impacts – Effect of IGESP on Crime Rates (ln), Difference-in-difference (OLS) – 
Municipalities in Minas Gerais, 2000-2008 
        
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Vars. homicide  homicide  property  property  personal  personal 
                    
igesp -0.0118  -0.0394 -0.332***  -0.330*** -0.140*** -0.147*** 
  [0.0586] [0.0678] [0.0560] [0.0536] [0.0392] [0.0396] 
igespt-1 -0.121***  -0.0948**  -0.289*** -0.211***  -0.0842 -0.0704 
  [0.0370] [0.0449] [0.0452] [0.0339] [0.0609] [0.0519] 
igespt-2   -0.0911*    -0.170***   -0.0434 
   [0.0548]  [0.0484]  [0.0348] 
const  2.143*** 2.263*** 4.671*** 4.871*** 3.884*** 3.962*** 
  [0.0367] [0.0315] [0.0254] [0.0279] [0.0200] [0.0185] 
        
Obs  6824 5971 6824 5971 6824 5971 
R
2  0.678 0.696 0.871 0.876 0.677 0.690 
Obs.: Robust standard-errors in brackets (clustering at municipality); *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dependent variables 
are ln of crime rates (per 100,000 inhabitants). All regressions include municipality and year dummies, and are weighted by 
municipality population. 853 municipalities. 
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The results discussed up to now suggest that the effect of the IGESP is stronger for 
property crimes. This has been the standard in most of the crime literature, also in the context 
of other interventions: economically motivated crimes tend to respond more to programs 
targeted at crime prevention and control. For these crimes, it is more likely that criminals make 
a rational cost-benefit analysis of potential gains involved in a certain action. According to this 
logic, crimes with a more personal and emotional character, that typically constitute a large 
fraction of homicides and personal crimes, are likely to be less responsive in the short-run to 
improvements in police action. The pattern of results obtained, therefore, is consistent with 
what should be expected from the technology of intervention represented by the IGESP. 
In light of the results from Tables 2 and 3, but trying to keep the specifications as simple 
as possible and not to lose time-series variation when not strictly necessary, we use the first lag 
of the IGESP (whether the municipality already had the program in the previous year) as the 
treatment variable for the case of homicides. For property and personal crimes, we keep the 
simultaneous presence of the IGESP as the treatment variable.  
The main problem with the previous results is that municipalities that receive the IGESP 
may be different from those that do not. Therefore, in Table 4, we include in the benchmark 
specification the municipal controls discussed in the previous section. The central issue tackled 
in the table is whether municipalities that received the IGESP were also experiencing other 
relevant changes simultaneously to the introduction of the program. There are at least three 
circumstances in which this would seem reasonable and even expected. First, the IGESP may 
bring with it other changes in the area of public safety, particularly changes related to greater 
effort in the fight against crime and more allocation of resources to the area. Second, if 
municipalities receiving the IGESP are particularly concerned with crime, they may be also 
adopting other programs to reduce violence. And, finally, municipalities pressuring the state 
government for implementation of the IGESP may be those with good governments, and 
therefore may also experience good performance in other socioeconomic dimensions that end 
up affecting crime.  
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Table 4: Controlling for Confounding Factors – Effect of IGESP on Crime Rates (ln), Difference-in-
difference (OLS) – Municipalities in Minas Gerais, 2000-2008 
        
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Vars. homicide  homicide  homicide  homicide 
igespt-1 -0.130***  -0.139**  -0.133*** -0.129*** 
  [0.0485] [0.0559] [0.0505] [0.0390] 
Controls  Included:      
Police Resources and Personnel   X      X 
Other Public Safety Programs    X    X 
Socioeconomic Characteristics      X  X 
Obs  6824 6824 6823 6823 
R
2  0.679 0.679 0.679 0.679 
  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Vars.  property  property  property  property 
igesp -0.531***  -0.480*** -0.521*** -0.475*** 
  [0.0544] [0.0657] [0.0622] [0.0693] 
Controls Included:      
Police Resources and Personnel   X      X 
Other Public Safety Programs    X    X 
Socioeconomic Characteristics      X  X 
Obs  7677 7677 7676 7676 
R
2  0.868 0.867 0.867 0.868 
  (9) (10)  (11)  (12) 
Vars.  personal  personal  personal  personal 
igesp -0.210***  -0.160*** -0.185*** -0.159*** 
  [0.0434] [0.0488] [0.0333] [0.0474] 
Controls Included:      
Police Resources and Personnel   X      X 
Other Public Safety Programs    X    X 
Socioeconomic Characteristics      X  X 
Obs  7677 7677 7676 7676 
R
2  0.669 0.668 0.668 0.669 
Obs.: Robust standard-errors in brackets (clustering at municipality); *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dependent 
variables are ln of crime rates (per 100,000 inhabitants). All regressions include a constant, municipality and year 
dummies, and are weighted by municipality population. 853 municipalities. Control variables are: Military and Civil 
Police personnel and Military Police # of cars (per capita) for police resources and personnel; dummies indicating 
the presence of a Civil Municipal Guard and o f the programs “Fica Vivo” and “Olho Vivo,” for other public safety 
programs; and gdp per capita and enrollment rate in public schools for socioeconomic variables. 
 
With that perspective in mind, we introduce in Table 4 control variables that account for 
differences across municipalities in police resources, other programs targeting crime, and local 
socioeconomic conditions and policies. The table shows that our previous results remain 
virtually unaltered when each of these sets of controls is included at a time, or when all of them   24
are included simultaneously. Considering the specification that includes all controls at the same 
time (columns 4, 8, and 12), the results suggest that IGESP adoption is associated with 
reductions in the incidence of crimes of the order of 47% for property crimes, 16% for personal 
crimes, and, with a lag of one year, 16% for homicides. The results related to personal crimes 
are the only ones that display a noticeable reduction in the coefficient as additional controls are 
introduced, but even in this case the effect remains large and statistically significant. For the 





In this section, we deal with three potential problems not addressed in our benchmark 
specification: differential dynamics of crime across municipalities, comparability of 
municipalities in the sample, and functional form of the estimating equation. 
                                                 
6 There is a well known problem of endogeneity of police allocation in this type of regression (see, for example, 
Levitt, 1997 e 2002, and Schargrodksy and di Tella, 2004). Police may be allocated to a certain area because crime 
rates are high, in which case a simple regression analysis may end up revealing a positive correlation between 
police and crime. This problem is no doubt present in our case, and some of the coefficients on the police variables 
(not shown in Table 4) do appear as positive and statistically significant. In addition, our variables for Civil Police 
personnel and number of Military Police cars seem to be measured with a lot of error (there are some wild 
variations in the series from year to year). In any case, none of these problems affect the basic results from Table 4 
or any of the results presented in the next sections. If we exclude these three variables altogether, the estimated 
coefficients remain virtually identical. In the appendix Table A.2.2, we go one step further, by eliminating the 
variables on Military Police cars and Civil Police personnel and instrumenting for the variable indicating the 
number of Military Police per capita. Our instrument is the interaction of battalion and year dummies, and trusts 
on the idea that there are two steps in the allocation of Military Police to different areas. First, the number of 
policemen per battalion is determined following bureaucratic and administrative guidelines. Following, the 
number of policemen within a battalion is allocated to different areas according to the discretion of the 
commander. The key identifying assumption is really that there is more freedom for a battalion commander to 
allocate policemen to different areas under his/her command, than to increase or reduce the total number of 
policemen under his/her command (exchanges with the State Secretariat of Social Defense suggested that this is 
roughly a good approximation for the allocation mechanism). In other words, variation of policemen at the level of 
battalions is more exogenous than within battalions. Indeed, the first stage in this strategy is extremely strong, 
with the F statistic for the joint hypothesis that the coefficients on the instruments are zero (battalion-year 
interaction dummies) of the order of 1.7 × 10
8. In Table A.2.2, we present the results from the second stage of this 
estimation, portraying both the coefficients on the IGESP variable and on the instrumented policemen variable. 
The estimated impacts of the IGESP are virtually unchanged. And the instruments for Military Police allocation 
seem to do at least part of the job: the effect of policemen per capita appears as negative and significant for 
property crimes, negative but non-significant for homicides, and positive but small in magnitude and very far from 
significant for personal crimes. In any case, the coefficient on the treatment variable shows that the previous 
results are in no way related to potential problems of endogeneity or measurement error in police related 
variables.   25
One of the main problems with our empirical approach, alluded to in section 4, refers to 
the possibility of a differential dynamic behavior of crime rates across municipalities, potentially 
associated with endogeneity in the adoption of the program. This phenomenon may occur, for 
example, when there is convergence or mean reversion in crime rates across regions and 
municipalities with initially higher crime rates are more likely to receive the IGESP. In this 
situation, we would estimate an effect of the program that would reflect simply the differential 
dynamic behavior of crime across municipalities starting from different levels. 
Table 5 addresses this issue. For each type of crime, the table presents two columns. In 
the first one, in addition to the variables included in the specification from Table 4, we include a 
linear trend for each municipality. In other words, we let each municipality have its own specific 
evolution in crime rates and ask whether, even in this setting, adoption of the IGESP was 
associated with deviations from this trend. Notice that this is very demanding on the data, since 
we impose 853 independent time trends in the specification. In the second set of columns, we 
include a dummy variable equal to 1 in the two years prior to IGESP implementation (PRE-IGESP 
DUMMY). The goal of this exercise is to check whether there was already a noticeable pre-
existing trend in the behavior of crime rates before the program was adopted. 
Columns 1, 2, and 3 from Table 5 show that the estimated effect of the IGESP remains 
negative and statistically significant for all types of crimes even when a municipality-specific 
linear trend is added to the basic specification. For property crimes, the estimated coefficient is 
reduced in magnitude, but it remains strongly significant. For homicides, the estimated 
coefficient increases in relation to that from Table 4, while for personal crimes it remains 
virtually identical. In reality, this specification can be seen as a very conservative and extreme 
test, since it is possible that the convergence in crime rates itself is determined in part by the 
implementation of the IGESP.  
When we include the variable capturing pre-existing trends, the results remain very 
similar to those from Table 4. More important, the pre-existing trend is positive in two out of 
the three cases and is not close to statistical significance in any of them. Therefore, our main 
results are not affected by explicitly dealing with the possibility of differential trends, and there   26
is no evidence of problems of dynamic endogeneity or pre-existing trends. Indeed, the 
estimated coefficients seem to reflect a causal effect of the IGESP on crime rates.  
 
Table 5: Municipality Linear Trends and Pre-existing Trends – Effect of IGESP on Crime Rates 
(ln), Difference-in-difference (OLS) – Municipalities in Minas Gerais, 2000-2008 
        
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Vars.  homicide property personal homicide property personal 
                 
igesp   -0.236*** -0.130***  -0.513***  -0.138** 
   [0.0481]  [0.0450]    [0.105]  [0.0574] 
igespt-1  -0.221***    -0.095**    
  [0.0846]    [0.0481]    
pre-igesp      0.110 -0.0562  0.0311 
dummy      [0.0702] [0.0714] [0.0444] 
municipality lienar 
trend included? 
X X X 
   
        
Obs  6823 7676 7676 6823 7676 7676 
R
2  0.732 0.896 0.731 0.680 0.868 0.669 
Obs.: Robust standard-errors in brackets (clustering at municipality); *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dependent variables 
are ln of crime rates (per 100,000 inhabitants). All regressions include a constant, municipality and year dummies, and are 
weighted by municipality population, and the following controls (not shown in the Table): Military and Civil Police personnel 
and Military Police # of cars (per capita); dummies indicating the presence of a Civil Municipal Guard and o f the programs 
“Fica Vivo” and “Olho Vivo;” gdp per capita and enrollment rate in public schools. 853 municipalities. 
 
Another potential concern suggested by the numbers in Table 1 is that municipalities 
that did not receive the IGESP are so different from those that received it that they do not 
constitute a good comparison group. A related concern is that the number of treated 
municipalities is relatively small (56), so that the previous results may depend on the presence 
of specific outliers. Municipalities that received the IGESP are indeed much larger, wealthier, 
and more violent than municipalities that did not receive it, so these concerns are legitimate. 
We address these and other issues in Table 6, where we re-estimate the most complete 
specification from Table 4 on alternative samples, and check the sensitivity of the results to the 
changes. The table not only addresses these concerns, but it also helps us understand where 
the variation identifying the estimated coefficients is coming from. We look at four alternatives: 
(i) excluding the state capital – which is almost 4 times larger than the second largest 
municipality – from the estimation; (ii) restricting the sample to municipalities with more than 
50,000 inhabitants, to create a control group more similar to the municipalities that received   27
the IGESP; (iii) restricting the sample to 2004-2008 interval, to reduce the weight of a long 
baseline period without implementation of the IGESP (the first program implementation takes 
place in 2005); and (iv) re-estimating the model without population weights. The results are 
presented in Table 6. 
 
Table 6: Alternative Samples – Effect of IGESP on Crime Rates (ln), Difference-in-difference 
(OLS) – Municipalities in Minas Gerais, 2000-2008 
          
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  excluding state capital  restricting to pop > 50,000 
Vars. homicide  property  personal  homicide  property  personal 
          
igesp   -0.465*** -0.115**   -0.378***  -0.164*** 
   [0.0862]  [0.0525]  [0.0728]  [0.0462] 
igespt-1  -0.0783     -0.187***    
  [0.0656]    [0.0520]    
        
Obs  6,815 7,667  7,667  511  570  570 
R
2  0.629 0.833 0.637 0.900 0.944 0.909 
 (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
  restricting to 2004-2008  unweighted 
Vars. homicide  property  personal  homicide  property  personal 
          
igesp   -0.378*** -0.164***  -0.296***  -0.0261 
   [0.0466]  [0.0439]   [0.104]  [0.106] 
igespt-1  -0.180***     0.127     
  [0.0519]     [0.169]     
        
Obs  4,264 4,264 4,264 6,823 7,676 7,676 
R
2  0.737 0.888 0.720 0.414 0.576 0.469 
Obs.: Standard-errors in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dependent variables are ln of crime rates 
(per 100,000 inhabitants). All regressions include a constant, municipality and year dummies, and are 
weighted by municipality population (unless otherwise noticed), and the following controls (not shown in 
the Table): Military and Civil Police personnel and Military Police # of cars (per capita); dummies indicating 
the presence of a Civil Municipal Guard and o f the programs “Fica Vivo” and “Olho Vivo;” gdp per capita 
and enrollment rate in public schools. 853 municipalities. 
 
Excluding the state capital from the estimation (columns 1-3), the results related to 
property and personal crimes remain unchanged, while the lagged effect of the program on 
homicide rates is reduced in magnitude and becomes non-significant. When the sample is 
restricted to municipalities with population above 50,000 (columns 4-6), or to the years 2004-
2008 (columns 7-9), the qualitative results remain very similar and there are only small   28
quantitative changes: the coefficients on homicides and personal crimes become slightly larger, 
while that on property crimes becomes slightly smaller. Finally, when we run the same 
specifications without population weights, only the effect on property crimes remains 
statistically significant. This should not be surprising, given the high degree of noise in crime 
rates for municipalities with small populations and for crimes with lower incidence. Sill, it is 
particularly reassuring that the effect of the IGESP on property crimes appears as statistically 
significant and quantitatively sizeable in every single specification presented thus far. 
The final robustness test we conduct is related to the functional form of the estimating 
equation. First, to deal with the issue of crime rates equal to zero in some small municipalities, 
we substituted the value of the logarithm by zero for all crime rates between zero and one. This 
procedure may affect quantitatively the estimated coefficients when the mean of the 
dependent variable is small, biasing the estimation of the causal effects of implementation of 
the program. In addition, our dependent variables are naturally censured at zero. Under some 
circumstances, this may bias the estimate obtained by OLS.  
To deal with these possibilities, we estimate regressions identical to those 
corresponding to the complete specification from Table 4, but use Tobit models instead of OLS. 
Despite the problem of incidental parameters in non-linear models with fixed-effects, we trust 
on the Monte Carlo results from Greene (2004) and estimate our Tobit models with fixed-
effects by “brute force.” Greene (2004) presents evidence that bias in Tobit models with fixed-
effects appear very small for T ≥ 5 and depend chiefly on the fraction of censored observations 
in the sample. Since our sample has T = 9, we draw on his results and discuss explicitly the likely 
bias when presenting the results. To assess the sensitivity of the results to the logarithmic 
transformation used, we also estimate the same Tobit models using the crime rates in levels as 
dependent variables. Results are reported in Table 7. 
The first three columns present the results with the same dependent variables used 
before, but considering explicitly their censoring at zero. The quantitative and qualitative 
results are almost identical to those from the complete specification in Table 4. In the last three 
columns, we consider as dependent variables the crime rates in levels (without the logarithmic 
transformation). The qualitative results are again identical to those obtained previously.   29
Quantitatively, we must divide the marginal effect presented in the table by the means of the 
dependent variables in order to have a proportional change comparable to the coefficients 
estimated with the logarithmic version. Making this calculation, the results from Table 7 imply 
that the implementation of the IGESP would be associated with reductions of 27% in homicides 
(with a lag of one year), 61% in property crimes, and 21% in personal crimes. The estimated 
effects are of the same order of magnitude of those obtained before and, if anything, they 
indicate a stronger impact of the IGESP on crime. In any case, as it seems more natural to think 
that the absolute effect of the IGESP would depend on the initial level of crime, we believe that 
the previous specifications, using dependent variables as ln, do represent the most trustworthy 
results. 
Given the number of years in our sample and the fraction of censored observations in 
our dependent variables (from 46% for homicide rates to 6% for personal crimes), the results 
from Greene (2004) suggest that the bias in estimated marginal effects and standard errors 
s h o u l d  b e  n o  g r e a t e r  t h a n  1 5 % .  I n  l i g h t  o f  t h e estimates in Table 7, such adjustments to 
coefficients and standard errors would change neither the qualitative nor the order of 
magnitude of the quantitative results. In fact, it would tend to bring the results closer to the 
point estimates from Table 4.  
 
Table 7: Tobit Models – Effect of IGESP on Crime Rates (ln and level per 100,000) – 
Municipalities in Minas Gerais, 2000-2008 
        
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  ln(rate per 100,000)  rate per 100,000 
Vars.  homicide property personal homicide property personal 
                    
igesp   -0.484*** -0.159***  -231.3*** -14.64*** 
   [0.0448]  [0.0383]   [7.346]  [1.290] 
igespt-1  -0.180**     -4.741***   
  [0.0706]     [0.749]    
        
Obs  6823 7676 7676 6823 7676 7676 
Obs.: Standard-errors in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dependent variables are ln of crime 
rates (per 100,000 inhabitants). All regressions include a constant, municipality and year dummies, and 
are weighted by municipality population, and the following controls (not shown in the Table): Military 
and Civil Police personnel and Military Police # of cars (per capita); dummies indicating the presence of a 
Civil Municipal Guard and o f the programs “Fica Vivo” and “Olho Vivo;” gdp per capita and enrollment 
rate in public schools. 853 municipalities. 
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5.3. Channels 
As a final exercise, we evaluate the impact of the IGESP on variables that try to capture 
dimensions of efficiency of police actions. These are variables related to apprehension of 
weapons (firearms and other weapons) and arrests (total and in flagrante delicto). The main 
question here is how police action responds to a certain level of violence. Therefore, we 
normalize these variables by the total number of crimes, so that we assess the effect of the 
IGESP on apprehension and clearance rates (transformed by the natural logarithm). 
The first equations estimated are identical to those from the most complete 
specification in Table 4. We also adopt a variant, given the distinct nature of the phenomenon. 
If there is an unusually high stock of weapons and criminals circulating in society, we might 
expect a temporary effect of the IGESP. The number of weapons apprehended and arrests 
would then go up after the implementation of the program, as police action became more 
effective and the “excess” number of criminals and weapons were taken out of society. With 
time, this number would be reduced, as the total number of crimes was also reduced, so that 
apprehension rates and clearance rates would eventually go back to their original levels (but in 
a lower crime context). This perspective is equivalent to the idea that it is easier to increase 
clearance rates when crime rates are high. To evaluate this possibility, we create treatment 
variables corresponding only to the first and second years of implementation.  
The results, presented in Table 8, suggest that implementation of the program increased 
both the apprehension of arms and the number of arrests per reported crime. The increase in 
apprehension rates seems to persist throughout the period observed in our sample. In the case 
of clearance rates, the effect shows up in the first years of the program, particularly so in the 
second year of implementation. The IGESP also seems to be associated with a reduction in the 
fraction of arrests in flagrante delicto, which seems reasonable since the program is supposed 
to increase the investigative capacity of police forces. 
The results from Table 8 reinforce the perception that the coefficients estimated before 
indeed reflect the causal impact of the IGESP on crime rates. The evidence suggests that part of 
this reduction in crime is due to a more effective response of the public safety apparatus.  
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Table 8: Efficacy of Police Action – Effect of IGESP on Weapon Apprehension and Clearance 
Rates (ln), Difference-in-difference (OLS) – Municipalities in Minas Gerais, 2000-2008 
          
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
weapon aprehension  clearance non-investig. 
arrests 





igesp 0.312***  0.188*  0.0127 0.0422  -0.141** 
 [0.0631]  [0.0972]  [0.0849]  [0.0882]  [0.0663] 
Controls Included:           
Police Resources and Personnel   X  X  X  X  X 
Other Public Safety Programs  X  X  X  X  X 
Socioeconomic Characteristics  X  X  X  X  X 
Obs 7676  7676  7676  7676  7676 
R
2 0.614  0.760  0.736  0.737  0.247 
   (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
Vars. 
weapon aprehension  clearance non-investig. 
arrests 





igesp year 1  0.207***  0.169*  0.0794  0.102*  -0.0492** 
 [0.0638]  [0.0931]  [0.0643]  [0.0597]  [0.0241] 
igesp year 2  0.158***  0.111** 0.138***  0.184***  -0.0316 
 [0.0480]  [0.0557]  [0.0474]  [0.0479]  [0.0249] 
Controls Included:         
Police Resources and Personnel   X  X  X  X  X 
Other Public Safety Programs  X  X  X  X  X 
Socioeconomic Characteristics  X  X  X  X  X 
Obs 7676  7676  7676  7676  7676 
R
2 0.612  0.760  0.736  0.738  0.245 
Obs.: Robust standard-errors in brackets (clustering at municipality); *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dependent variables are ln of 
rate of apprehension of weapons and arrests by total number of crimes, and ratio of arrests in flagrante delicto to total number of 
arrests. All regressions include a constant, municipality and year dummies, and are weighted by municipality population. 853 
municipalities. Controls are: Military and Civil Police personnel and Military Police # of cars (per capita) for police resources and 
personnel; dummies indicating presence of Municipal Guard and o f programs “Fica Vivo” and “Olho Vivo,” for other public safety 
programs; and gdp per capita and enrollment rate in public schools for socioeconomic variables. 
  
6. Concluding Remarks  
This paper evaluates the impact of the IGESP program on crime rates and effectiveness 
of police actions in the state of Minas Gerais, Brazil. The IGESP is a program targeting 
integration of the Civil and Military Polices, based on the introduction of information 
management systems and organizational changes akin to those associated with COMPSTAT.   32
The evidence presented points to a causal effect of the IGESP on crime. Our most conservative 
estimates suggest a reduction of 24% in property crimes and 13% in personal crimes. There is 
some evidence of a delayed reduction in homicide rates, but this seems to be particularly 
related to the experience of the state capital. The IGESP is also associated with improved police 
response to crime, measured by apprehension of weapons and clearance rates. To our 
knowledge, this is the first set of econometrically robust estimates of the effect of the 
integration of dual police forces on crime. The results suggest that the coordination and 
informational gains represented by this change may constitute a first-order factor in a 
successful policy for fighting crime.  
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Appendix 
Appendix A.1: Determinants of IGESP Adoption – Survival Analysis 
  In this appendix, we explicitly model the timing of IGESP adoption across municipalities. 
The main goal is to test whether the timing of IGESP adoption was correlated with previous 
shocks to the dependent variables, in which case our identification strategy would be 
compromised by a dynamic endogeneity problem. 
  We estimate hazard models using the Weibull distribution. Such distribution is more 
flexible in that it allows hazard functions to vary over time. So, differently from Galiani et al 
(2005) and Biderman et al (2010), we do not need to include explicit time controls to account 
for the change in probability of IGESP adoption across years. This possibility is incorporated in 
the estimation of the “shape” parameter. If this parameter is equal one,
7 the hazard ratio is 
constant through time and the probability of IGESP adoption depends only on municipalities’ 
characteristics. In every model estimated here, the shape parameter is greater than one,
8 
indicating that the probability of IGESP adoption increases over time (as we know to be the case 
in the data). 
  Our main goal is to understand whether IGESP adoption was mostly determined by fixed 
municipality characteristics, in which case our approach would be adequate, or whether it was 
correlated with past shocks to the dependent variables. Therefore, our initial specification 
considers only initial conditions and time invariant characteristics of municipalities. This 
specification includes, at first, initial crime rates (ln), income per capita (ln), population (ln), and 
number of military policemen per capita; then it adds the distance to the state capital; and 
then, finally, it adds dummies indicating the presence of a Military Police battalion, of a Civil 
Police regional station, and of both of these simultaneously. Following, we include, also 
sequentially, time-varying covariates: first, lagged differences of income per capita and 
population, and the presence of competing public safety programs (municipal guard, “Fica 
Vivo,” and “Olho Vivo”); following, the first lags of the different measures of crime rates; and 
then, finally, the second lags of crime rates. We estimate these models with initial conditions in 
                                                 
7 When this occurs the underlying distribution is an Exponential, which is memoryless.  
8 The shape parameter is given by the expression 1/exp(log(scale)).   36
the beginning of our sample period (2000) and also in 2003. Since the IGESP was a policy 
implemented by the government that took office in 2003 (Governor Aécio Neves), public 
security authorities could have used 2003’s criminal and social indicators to decide on 
implementation of the program. Results considering 2000 and 2003 as the initial periods are 
presented, respectively, in Tables A.1.1 and A.1.2 (coefficients are presented as hazard ratios). 
  In the first column of Table A.1.1, one can see that differences in levels of population, 
GDP per capita, homicides, and property crimes help explain program adoption (though higher 
homicide rates appear as reducing the probability of IGESP implementation; in any case, this 
particular result is not robust).
9 Of these, the most robust result across specifications and initial 
years is that related to property crimes: municipalities with initially higher rates of property 
crimes were more likely to receive the program in any given year.  
  But two key dimensions of implementation were related to operational and 
administrative aspects of the IGESP. First, the state government pushed implementation from 
the state capital outward to the interior. As a result, the timing of implementation followed a 
clear radial pattern of geographic expansion, illustrated here in Figure A.1.1. Second, IGESP 
implementation demanded a coordination of actions between Civil and Military polices that 
inevitably imposed a top-down approach (lower levels could not be integrated until the 
hierarchically superior spheres were integrated). So implementation naturally started in 
municipalities that had hierarchically superior units of the two institutions (Civil Police regional 
stations and Military Police battalions). In terms of the new geographic organization of the 
system of public security, these were municipalities that housed headquarters of ACISP’s, which 
would be roughly equivalent to local regional commands. These were also municipalities that 
gathered better conditions for IGESP implementation, where the program could be adopted 
faster and at a lower cost (given the previous presence of both Civil and Military Police 
structures). 
 
                                                 
9 Notice that, since coefficients are presented as hazard ratios, hypothesis tests are conducted against the null that 
the coefficients are equal to 1.   37
Table A.1.1: IGESP Adoption – Hazard Models –Initial Conditions in 2000 
 
Variables (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Fixed Pre-treatment Characteristics as of 2000:          
2.5287** 1.8595  1.7777  2.8322  2.7666  2.8673  Population2000 
[0.7593] [0.5803] [0.6646] [1.1382]  [1.1061]  [1.1596] 
0.6568* 0.7826  0.8136  0.6899  0.6868  0.6763  GDP2000 
[0.1805] [0.2163] [0.2443] [0.2061]  [0.2029]  [0.1995] 
0.6315*** 0.7572** 0.8024*  0.8529  0.8967  0.8875  Homicide2000 
[0.0998] [0.1103] [0.1164] [0.1394]  [0.1476]  [0.1475] 
3.2333*** 2.2034*** 2.4695*** 1.8647** 1.9456** 1.9372**  Property2000 
[0.7152] [0.4244] [0.5471] [0.3677]  [0.3951]  [0.395] 
1.3258 1.2590 1.2775 1.1781  1.0773  1.0639  Personal2000 
[0.2294] [0.2012] [0.2132] [0.2121]  [0.2004]  [0.2016] 
Military Police2000 1.0003  1.0003  1.0000  1.0017**  1.0016*  1.0018** 
 [0.0006]  [0.0006]  [0.0006]  [0.0008]  [0.0009]  [0.0009] 
Distance to Capital    0.2644*** 0.2597*** 0.2944***  0.2857***  0.2863*** 
   [0.065]  [0.0682] [0.0768] [0.0752] [0.0752] 
Civil Police Regional      0.0002*** 0.0002***  0.0002***  0.0002*** 
     [0.0001]  [0.0001]  [0.0001]  [0.0001] 
Military Police Battalion      0.4187*  0.256***  0.229***  0.251*** 
     [0.3019]  [0.2132] [0.193] [0.2112] 
   21779***  31253***  37520***  32962***  Civil Police Regional x  
Military Police Battalion      [0.0000]  [0.0000]  [0.0000]  [0.0000] 
Time-varying Covariates:             
    1.0E-05*** 7.1E-06***  6.2E-06*** ∆GDPt-1 
    [1.8E-05]  [1.3E-05] [1.1E-05] 
    46.2924  48.7414  47.4820  ∆GDPt-2 
    [74.7304]  [76.1287]  [73.219] 
    3.1672  2.5479  2.5681  ∆Populationt-1 
    [2.1867]  [1.9521]  [1.8483] 
    2.2E+18  1.4E+18  6.5E+17  ∆Populationt-2 
    [2.7E+19]  [1.7E+19]  [8.3E+18] 
    0.5868*  0.6132  0.6255  Municipal Civil Guard 
    [0.2400]  [0.2522]  [0.2595] 
    2.9387  3.2838  3.1227  “Fica Vivo” 
    [1.7258]  [1.9594] [1.862] 
    0.1245***  0.1279***  0.1169***  “Olho Vivo” 
    [0.1489]  [0.1524]  [0.1414] 
     1.0694  1.0676  ∆Homicidest-1 
     [0.1589]  [0.1799] 
     0.7844*  0.7911  ∆Propertyt-1 
     [0.1171]  [0.1428] 
     0.8586  0.9377  ∆Personalt-1 
     [0.1405]  [0.1772] 
       1.0571  ∆Homicidest-2 
       [0.1739] 
       1.0315  ∆Propertyt-2 
       [0.1767] 
       1.2202  ∆Personalt-2 
       [0.2123] 
-1.417*** -1.594*** -1.554*** -1.898*** -1.910*** -1.916***  log(scale) 
[0.1225] [0.1151] [0.1196] [0.1195]  [0.1196]  [0.1193] 
Obs.: Coefficients presented as hazard ratios; standard-errors in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Hazard estimation 
with Weibull distribuition; municip. drops out of sample once IGESP is implemented. Vars in initial levels: crime rates (ln); gdp 
p.c.; pop.; military police p.c.; dist. to capital; presence of regional station of civil police, of military police battalion, and 
interaction of the two. Time varying variables are: lagged differences of gdp, population and crime rates; and presence of other 
public safety programs (municipal guard, “Fica Vivo,” and “Olho Vivo. 853 municipalities. 
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  Figure A.1.1: Geographic Pattern of IGESP Adoption 
 
  These two dimensions account for the bulk of the pattern of IGESP expansion over time 
(see columns 2 and 3 in the tables). Distance to the state capital
10 plays a major role in 
explaining program adoption. In column 2 from Table A.1.1, for example, increasing the 
distance in about 66 miles reduces the probability of receiving the program in a given year in 
about 74%. Column 3 from the table shows that presence of regional commands of the two 
police forces was also extremely important for adoption: the probability of receiving the IGESP 
was about 82% higher if a municipality had a Civil Police regional station and a Military Police 
battalion concomitantly. These main results are similar across other specifications and also 
considering 2003 as the initial period. 
  Following, we include time-varying covariates in the last three columns of each table. 
Overall, the time-varying covariates rarely appear as significant in explaining program adoption. 
Just one of the lagged differences of income per capita and population appear as statistically 
significant, but even then with an extremely small quantitative effect.
11 The only exception to 
this pattern is that municipalities which have the “Olho Vivo” program (cameras placed in key 
hot spots) have 88% less chance of receiving the IGESP. But there is a very small number of 
municipalities that received the “Olho Vivo” program by 2008 (only 4), so this result is in reality 
driven by one specific outlier (the municipality of Itabira, which received “Olho Vivo,” is 
relatively close to the state capital but did not receive the IGESP; Itabira is the only municipality 
with “Olho Vivo” that did not receive the IGESP). 
                                                 
10 This variable was constructed applying the Euclidian Norm to the Latitude-Longitude system. Distance 
distortions calculated this way tend to be small when relatively short distances are considered. 
11 The hazard models were estimated with R, which has a precision of up to 15 decimals. That is why we are able to 
estimate such small significant effect.    39
Table A.1.2: IGESP Adoption – Hazard Models –Initial Conditions in 2003 
 
Variables  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Fixed Pre-treatment Characteristics as of 2003:         
1.4104 1.1662  1.443  2.132  2.8423  3.0056  Population2003 
[0.4266]  [0.3961] [0.5387] [0.7984] [1.1737] [1.2544] 
0.7597 0.9175 0.8531  0.6974  0.645*  0.6312**  GDP2003 
[0.1919] [0.2579] [0.2512]  [0.185]  [0.1889]  [0.1841] 
0.891 1.0116 1.0528 1.2753 1.2152 1.1944  Homicide2003 
[0.1275]  [0.1389]  [0.15]  [0.2081] [0.1991] [0.1973] 
4.4968*** 2.5807*** 2.8816*** 2.74**  2.1489**  2.1289**  Property2003 
[1.1821]  [0.5904] [0.7063] [0.7005] [0.5375] [0.5328] 
1.1473  1.1935 1.1991 0.9266 0.8854 0.8808  Personal2003 
[0.2049]  [0.2186] [0.2375] [0.2132] [0.1695] [0.1784] 
1.0037*** 1.0039*** 1.004*** 1.0002  1.0035***  1.0041***  Military Police2003 
[0.0013] [0.001] [0.0011] [0.0015] [0.0013] [0.0014] 
Distance to Capital    0.2722*** 0.2631*** 0.1752*** 0.3034*** 0.3059*** 
    [0.0665] [0.0709] [0.0385] [0.0796] [0.0807] 
Civil Police Regional      4.0E-05*** 0.0098***  0.0001***  0.0001*** 
      [2.6E-05]  [0.0252] [4.71E-05] [0.0001] 
Military Police Battalion      0.2426*** 0.3019*** 0.2133*** 0.2404*** 
      [0.1798] [0.2066] [0.1644] [0.1836] 
   88330***  54566  104961***  74917***  Civil Police Regional x 
Military Police Battalion      [0.0000] [1397340] [0.0000]  [0.0000] 
Time-varying  Covariates:         
    3.4E-07*** 1.1E-06***  9.7E-07*** ∆GDPt-1 
    [5.4E-07]  [2.0E-06] [1.8E-06] 
    39.899  17.7163  15.3502  ∆GDPt-2 
      [39.0373] [22.7077] [19.4944] 
    4.4198  1.8386  1.712  ∆Populationt-1 
      [3.4713] [1.5256] [1.2536] 
      3.3E+22 5.8E+14 1.3E+15  ∆Populationt-2 
      4.6E+23 8.6E+15 2.0E+16 
      1.6287 0.6317 0.6553  Municipal Civil Guard 
      [0.4742] [0.2595] [0.2716] 
      1.0366 2.2433 2.0487  “Fica Vivo” 
    [0.5597]  [1.33]  [1.2192] 
      0.0424*** 0.0982*** 0.0811***  “Olho Vivo” 
      [0.0437] [0.1191] [0.1007] 
      1.0839  1.099  ∆Homicidest-1 
      [0.1638]  [0.1904] 
      0.7945  0.8418  ∆Propertyt-1 
      [0.1365]  [0.1625] 
      0.9173  0.9973  ∆Personalt-1 
      [0.1628]  [0.1976] 
       1.1006  ∆Homicidest-2 
       [0.1771] 
       1.1226  ∆Propertyt-2 
       [0.1979] 
       1.2224  ∆Personalt-2 
       [0.2248] 
-1.443***  -1.632*** -1.610*** -2.165*** -1.983*** -1.993***  log(scale) 
[0.1209]  [0.1148] [0.1190] [0.0000] [0.1203] [0.1201] 
Obs.: Coefficients presented as hazard ratios; standard-errors in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Hazard estimation 
with Weibull distribuition; municip. drops out of sample once IGESP is implemented. Vars in initial levels: crime rates (ln); gdp 
p.c.; pop.; military police p.c.; dist. to capital; presence of regional station of civil police, of military police battalion, and 
interaction of the two. Time varying variables are: lagged differences of gdp, population and crime rates; and presence of other 
public safety programs (municipal guard, “Fica Vivo,” and “Olho Vivo. 853 municipalities.   40
  Most importantly from our perspective, past shocks to criminal variables do not appear 
as significant in explaining adoption, except for one lag of property crimes in one particular 
specification, which is significant at the 10% level (column 5 in Table A.1.1). Being only one 
among the 18 coefficients estimated on lagged differences in crime rates, we do not place 
much weight on this result. In any case, even if we take it at face value, it would imply that 
doubling property crime rates would reduce the probability of program adoption by 22%, a 
r e l a t i v e l y  m i l d  e f f e c t  a s  c o m p a r e d  t o  t h a t  related to distance from the state capital and 
presence of regional police commands. 
  In other respects, the inclusion of the time-varying covariates seems to reinforce 
previous results: the coefficient associated with distance to the capital does not change much, 
while the presence of a Civil Police regional station and a Military Police battalion increase the 
probability of adoption in about 64%. It is also worth mentioning that, on the whole, the results 
considering 2003 as the initial period seem better behaved: initial homicide rates never appear 
as reducing the probability of later program adoption, and the lagged differences in crime rates 
never appear as statistically significant. 
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Appendix A.2: Supplementary Tables and Figures 
 
Table A.2.1: Integrated Regions of Public Safety (RISP’s) before 2010 
Descriptive Statistics (averages 2000-2008) 
 
RISP Headquarters  (Municip.)  #  Municip. Population  Area  (Km
2) Demog.  Density 
1 Belo  Horizonte  1  2.338.766 332  7.043,0
2 Contagem  17  1.646.941 4.380  376,0
3 Vespasiano  22  918.785 8.427  109,0
4 Juiz  de  Fora  86  1.499.313 21.493  69,8
5 Uberaba  32  671.728 41.915  16,0
6 Lavras  143  2.232.245 47.019  47,5
7 Divinópolis  84  1.529.809 49.144 31,1
8 Governador  Valadares  50  639.232 21.053  30,4
9 Uberlândia  14  893.694 26.413  33,8
10 Patos  de  Minas  25  498.299 32.095  15,5
11 Montes  Claros  76  1.365.527 100.451  13,6
12 Ipatinga  101  1.682.115 32.893  51,1
13 Barbacena  56  770.807 16.389  47,0
14 Curvelo  68  1.004.653 70.322  14,3
15 Teófilo  Otoni  61  861.395 56.580  15,2
16 Unaí  17  331.562 59.471  5,6
Sources: Fundação João Pinheiro; Secretaria de Defesa Social; DATASUS  
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Table A.2.2: Instrumental Variables for Military Police Personnel – Effect of IGESP on Crime 
Rates (ln), Difference-in-difference (OLS) – Municipalities in Minas Gerais, 2000-2008 
      
   (1)  (2)  (3) 
Vars. homicides  property  personal 
           
igesp   -0.469***  -0.155*** 
   [0.0720]  [0.0453] 
igespt-1 -0.112**     
 [0.0504]     
instrumented 
Military Police  -198.5 -235.6* 60.64 
 [142.2]  [126.8]  [91.16] 
      
Obs 6823  7676  7676 
Obs.: Robust standard-errors in brackets (clustering at municipality); *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Dependent variables are ln of crime rates (per 100,000 inhabitants). All regressions include a constant, 
municipality and year dummies, and are weighted by municipality population, and the following controls 
(not shown in the Table): Military Police personnel (per capita); dummies indicating the presence of a 
Civil Municipal Guard and o f the programs “Fica Vivo” and “Olho Vivo;” gdp per capita and enrollment 
rate in public schools. 853 municipalities. Military Police personnel p.c. instrumented with the interaction 
of batallion and year dummies.  
 
 
 
 
 